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Abstract
Both advocates of corporate regulation and its opponents tend to depict regulation as restrictive—a policy option that limits 
freedom in the name of welfare or other social goods. Against this framing, I suggest we can understand regulation in ena-
bling terms. If well designed and properly enforced, regulation enables companies to operate in ways that are acceptable to 
society as a whole. This paper argues for this enabling character by considering some wider questions about responsibility 
and the sharing of responsibility. Agents who are less able or willing to act well are obviously more likely to face criticism, 
mistrust, and adverse responses. It will be more difficult to hold those agents responsible, especially so when there are many 
who fail in their responsibilities or where there are wide-reaching disagreements about those responsibilities. Regulatory 
standards, like other norms and ways of defining responsibilities, address these problems: by restricting, they also enable 
social cooperation. Like other forms of holding responsible, ways of enforcing those standards against recalcitrant agents, 
or encouraging conformity to them, may also seem restrictive. Again, however, these practices play an important role in 
enabling responsible agency. This is partly because they can bolster readiness to act well in agents who experience or witness 
such responses. It is also because they free other agents to exercise initiative and commitment in defining their individual 
responsibilities in line with higher standards.
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Introduction
Corporate regulation is a central issue of our time. Some 
voices deplore regulation as a limitation on freedom and 
enterprise. Companies and lobbyists talk about regulation 
as ‘red tape’ and extol the virtues of self-regulation. These 
claims have had some impact in removing regulations or 
enforcement mechanisms. Many other constituencies criti-
cise this weakening of regulatory regimes or call for closer 
regulation of corporate activities. The concerns are well 
known and wide ranging: public health risks, environmental 
damage, harmful financial systems, the commercialisation 
of childhood, heavy market concentration, poor employment 
conditions, the confusion of information with propaganda, 
and much more besides.
Both opponents and advocates of regulation usually 
depict regulation in restrictive terms—a policy measure 
that limits freedom in the name of welfare or social goods.1 
In this paper, I will argue that this framing is mistaken and 
places the burden of proof too heavily on advocates of vari-
ous regulatory measures. Instead, I believe that we should 
understand regulation in enabling terms. If well designed 
and fairly enforced, regulation can enable companies to do 
what they generally say they want to do: to operate in ways 
that are acceptable to society as a whole. This attempt to 
reframe regulation is open to obvious counter-argument. 
Like all rules and norms, regulations are bound to have 
restrictive aspects—they may cost money or limit the scope 
of specific markets; they may be badly framed or have 
unwanted effects (for example, discouraging new market 
entrants). As with other rules and norms, regulation raises 
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1 For an influential statement of this view, see Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics (2007). Although it eschews the language of paternalism 
(or even ‘nanny state’) in favour of ‘stewardship’, this report there-
fore repeats the framing of such interventions used by industry front 
groups such as the US Center for Consumer Freedom (e.g. 2012). I 
also note one referee’s comment, to the effect that regulations in par-
ticular markets operate as conditions rather than restrictions since 
there is, after all, no obligation on any corporation to enter a particu-
lar area of business.
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questions of responsibility. Compliance cannot be taken for 
granted; enforcement may prove hard or impossible, espe-
cially where a powerful actor disputes the validity or appli-
cability of a given norm. Above all, regulations will only 
seem enabling to an organisation that is ready and willing 
to act on the standards that they lay down.
To defend a more positive, enabling view of corporate 
regulation, this paper considers some fundamental philo-
sophical questions about responsibility and the sharing of 
responsibility. In particular, I will highlight the collective 
endeavour that responsible agents can and must engage in, 
to allocate and divide responsibilities between themselves. 
(Throughout, I use the term ‘agents’ to refer to both indi-
vidual persons and to collective actors like corporations, 
regulatory agencies, and legislative bodies.) There is no 
doubt that this endeavour involves limits and restrictions—
the definition of specific responsibilities and attempts to hold 
responsible where agents fail to fulfil these. My claim will 
be that these restrictions also have an enabling character, in 
the sense of enabling cooperation and also in fostering and 
constituting abilities to act responsibly.
In highlighting this collective enterprise, I mean to strike 
a different path to that taken in most philosophical accounts 
of responsibility. The past decades have seen important dis-
cussions of collective responsibility, exploring the ways in 
which we can compare the capacities and actions of col-
lective actors—such as business corporations—to those of 
individual persons, and the ways in which it may be appro-
priate to hold such collectives responsible.2 However, there 
is another way in which collective aspects might figure in 
a theory of responsibility.3 Philosophical accounts tend to 
focus on the capacities and actions and liabilities of a spe-
cific agent, be it individual or collective. This means that 
they sideline the ways in which agents enable one another 
and share responsibility by treating one another as respon-
sible agents. In this paper, I suggest that we can see these 
forms of sharing and enablement when both individual 
and collective agents interact. As well as being especially 
urgent, the corporate case is illuminating because the stand-
ards that corporate actors ought to fulfil are so disputed. 
This makes it harder to bracket difficult questions about the 
norms that agents ought to live up to; hence it invites us to 
consider how those norms should be decided and enforced, 
so too the actual practices involved in holding responsible 
and the ways in which those practices must relate to the 
capacities of both accuser and culprit. When we consider 
business corporations, two vital background conditions of 
responsibility become obvious: the allocation, division, and 
sharing of responsibilities between agents; and the fostering 
of capacities to fulfil these responsibilities. Both conditions 
reveal how setting and upholding standards has an enabling 
character.4
Before setting out the structure of the paper, let me say 
a word on the relevant meanings of ‘responsibility’, since 
these are so central to my argument.5 I will be concerned 
only with normative uses of the term, where ‘normative’ 
covers a variety of standards: moral, legal, and regulatory. 
This closes off purely causal usages, such as ‘The muta-
tion of the virus was responsible for the virulence of the 
epidemic’, but still leaves a lot open. First, we can speak 
of responsibility in retrospective and prospective senses.6 
Retrospectively, we may hold an agent responsible for vari-
ous actions or omissions, and I will underline the variety of 
practices involved when we do this. Prospectively, responsi-
bilities can refer to duties or roles or standards: for example, 
responsibilities to comply with regulations, to look after a 
particular child, or to honour a contract. There is a simple 
analytic connection between these: it will only be justified 
to hold an agent responsible (retrospective) where he, she, 
or it has somehow failed to fulfil his, her, or its (prospective) 
responsibilities. As I will stress, however, this connection is 
complicated in practice: if there is dispute about the relevant 
standards (prospective), attempts to hold responsible (ret-
rospective) are bound to prove contentious. Second, agents 
can bear, take, and share responsibility. These things can be 
done both prospectively and retrospectively. A regulatory 
authority is created to bear or take responsibility for decid-
ing or enforcing standards in a particular area (prospective); 
should it fail to regulate well, it might also bear responsibil-
ity, in the sense of being open to blame or sanctions, or take 
responsibility, in the sense of striving to make amends (ret-
rospective). Several companies might share responsibility 
in the sense of collaborating on a self-regulatory initiative 
(prospective); they might also bear or share responsibility, in 
the sense of all being partly to blame for the collapse of cer-
tain standards in their business sector (retrospective). Third, 
note that the adjective ‘responsible’ can be used in three 
ways: (i) A responsible agent may refer to an agent with 
certain capacities that make it appropriate to regard the agent 
as bound to fulfil some (prospective) responsibilities and 
liable to be held responsible (retrospective) if it does not—in 
2 Key points in these debates include French (1984), May (1992), 
and List and Pettit (2011). An excellent overview is Smiley (2017).
3 For one account that does see responsibility in these terms, see 
Barnes (2001). While as philosophically acute as one could wish, 
it is notable that Barnes comes from the perspective of sociological 
theory.
4 On the distinguished philosophical pedigree of this idea, see Bran-
dom (1979).
5 See also the classic exposition by Hart (1968, p.  211), as well as 
Vincent (2011) and Williams (2012).
6 This distinction is central to Goodin (1987). It is clearly set out by 
Duff (1998) and thoughtfully explored by Richardson (1999). See 
also Miller (2001).
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this case, the contrary is ‘non-responsible’, like the virus 
mentioned above. (ii) We may refer to an agent as respon-
sible when assigning blame or liability or credit (retrospec-
tive, e.g. ‘The CEO was partly responsible (that is, culpable 
or blameworthy) for the company’s failure’)—in this case, 
the contrary is ‘not responsible’ in the sense of innocent or 
uninvolved. (iii) We may praise an agent as ‘responsible’, 
as having particular virtues (Williams 2008)—in this case, 
the contrary is to criticise an agent as ‘irresponsible’. This 
sheer variety of meanings may raise doubt as to whether 
‘responsibility’ is a term fit to bear theoretical weight. On 
the account offered here, however, the uses are importantly 
related, and the paper’s final paragraph summarises the con-
nections highlighted by my argument.
The paper is in five sections. The first section highlights a 
philosophical perplexity about responsibility that arises from 
one prominent way of understanding the connection between 
an agent’s normative capacities and his, her, or its culpabil-
ity. I will suggest that this apparently theoretical perplexity 
would be better approached in practical terms—that is, in 
terms of difficulties in sharing responsibility and holding 
responsible. The second section considers one side of this 
difficulty—the problems and practices bound up with hold-
ing responsible when agents are less able or willing to take 
responsibility (in both prospective and retrospective senses). 
The third section considers the other side of the problem: 
how to arrive at defensible agreements concerning the stand-
ards different agents ought to fulfil and how responsibilities 
should be distributed. In particular, I suggest that the less 
responsible the agents are (in the sense of lacking the virtue 
of responsibility), the less able they are to appreciate the 
responsibilities (prospective) that they ought to fulfil. As a 
result, others must step in to define these for them. In this 
case, regulations and responsibilities appear in the guise of 
external impositions and restrictions, thus obscuring their 
enabling role. In a short fourth section, I draw some les-
sons for the relation between capacities and retrospective 
responsibility, before returning to the enabling role of corpo-
rate regulation in a fifth section. This underlines the ways in 
which defining and upholding the roles and responsibilities 
of different actors facilitates cooperative relations and fosters 
capacities for responsibility.
A Philosophical Perplexity About 
Responsibility
It is now quite common in the philosophical literature to 
consider responsibility in terms of an agent’s responsive-
ness to reasons. The thought is simple: an agent that cannot 
respond to moral reasons is not responsible—thus animals, 
infants, insane persons, crowds, or perhaps even corpora-
tions (if these are understood, for example, in Bakan’s 
(2004) terms as psychopaths blind to all reasons apart from 
self-interest). Responsible agents can understand and act on 
(normative) reasons, whereas non-responsible agents can-
not. Such thoughts are often bolstered by the maxim ‘ought 
implies can’7: there cannot be duties without a capacity to 
fulfil them—or at least it is unfair to hold an agent to duties 
if she lacks the ability to fulfil them. If we think of holding 
responsible as imposing a cost or harm, a limitation or a 
restriction, then an agent ought to have a fair opportunity to 
avoid this. We find this sort of view in many writers advo-
cating compatibilist accounts of responsibility, such as Wolf 
(1990), Wallace (1994), Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Watson 
(2004), and, most recently, Nelkin (2011). These accounts 
overcome an obvious perplexity of metaphysical free will 
(how is responsibility meant to follow simply from being 
uncaused to act in any particular way?) by putting weight 
on capacities of obvious practical importance: the abilities 
to consider reasons and to act on them. Such accounts also 
accommodate the developmental nature of responsibility—
as children develop these capacities, we are more inclined 
to treat them as responsible for their actions—and the aber-
rations of agency that impair the responsibility of otherwise 
normal adults—forms of compulsion and addiction, for 
example. Most important for the present paper, they sug-
gest a promising approach to corporate responsibility (Hess 
2013). Some collectives are structured so as to respond to 
reasons—courts, for example, carefully weigh reasons to 
judge whether the accused has transgressed a legal require-
ment; equally, it makes more sense to hold a court account-
able than a crowd, say, which lacks such a structure.
I hope this sounds fair enough. But it leads to a strange 
result. Assuming that agents lie along a continuum in terms 
of capacities to respond to reasons, then less able agents 
will count as less responsible. If an agent consistently acts 
badly, then we lack any empirical basis on which to attribute 
an ability to respond to the relevant reasons; therefore that 
agent is non-responsible or less responsible for its wrong-
doing.8 In other words, it is precisely those agents who act 
worse—and who we might normally think of as needing to 
be held responsible more often and more stringently—who 
count as less responsible for their misdeeds. To use a corpo-
rate example: a badly managed company, with second-rate 
executives dominated by short-term shareholders, in a poor 
7 Contrast Kant’s use of this maxim: assuming that a duty exists, we 
must see ourselves as able to fulfil it (Stern 2004). Whatever its prob-
lems, this use frankly concedes, and indeed exploits, the difficulty of 
empirically disproving attributions of abilities.
8 The problem therefore draws together the first two uses of the 
adjective ‘responsible’ that I distinguished in introduction: first, 
whether we are dealing with a responsible agent at all and, second, to 
the extent that we are, whether that agent is responsible for a wrong 




regulatory environment—well, no surprise that it commits 
all sorts of malfeasance and proves unable to appreciate or 
act on reasons to do better. If culpability and capability go 
hand in hand, then such incorrigible, intractable wrongdo-
ers seem not to be responsible.9 By the same token, more 
virtuous agents seem to be more culpable should they, on 
occasion, commit comparable misdeeds.10
I believe that the conceptual puzzle arises because this 
framing—and, in particular, this way of using the adjec-
tive ‘responsible’—brackets the interactional aspects of 
responsibility. In seminar discussions, I have found it strik-
ing how often the question is posed: Is a corporation, or 
some of its members or officers, really responsible for its 
wrongdoing? As others have remarked, the tendency to add 
an emphatic really to an abstract but everyday term (for 
example, real, true, or good) often betrays a philosophical 
misstep: we move onto metaphysical terrain, without nec-
essarily appreciating the structure of use and practice that 
we are leaving behind. In this case, a question about how 
agents should interact has been framed in terms of a single 
agent’s attributes.11 As noted in my introduction, some enti-
ties, such as viruses or infants, are plainly non-responsible: 
it would be absurd to ascribe duties to them or to hold them 
responsible.12 But the question of how to deal with agents 
who persistently inflict harms and wrongs—be they vicious 
individuals or irresponsible corporations—is not so easily 
decided.
My proposal, then, is to step back and emphasise the 
practical aspects of attributing responsibility. The corpo-
rate case is especially illuminating because the practical 
difficulty (that is, how to get to grips with the irresponsible 
corporation) is more compelling than the theoretical one 
(that is, whether it is really responsible for its misconduct). 
The practical difficulty has two aspects, both prominent 
in debates about corporate regulation. First, can any other 
agent meaningfully hold it responsible? To answer this, 
we need to consider the variety of responses that we might 
make when an agent acts wrongly. Second, how can or 
should the various parties reach agreement on what counts 
as right- or wrongdoing? To focus on whether the agent is 
‘really responsible’ obscures this problem, not least because 
it neglects one of our most important forms of collective 
action: the allocation of responsibilities to specific agents. 
Again, the corporate case makes clear what we should have 
noticed in the individual case. Sharing out, judging, and 
revising responsibilities is primarily a matter of collective 
deliberation and mutual accommodation. Individual reason-
ing could never, on its own, decide the matter.13
Practical Implications of Limited Abilities 
to Act Well (I): Holding Responsible
Let me start with the question of what is involved in hold-
ing an agent responsible. First, notice that if we conceive 
of this as something simply done to an agent—such as a 
prison sentence or a fine or a removal of privileges—then 
there needs to be a large power inequality between accuser 
and culprit. Otherwise, there is a good chance that the cul-
prit can evade whatever penalties the accuser imposes, or 
pass these penalties onto others, or take counter-measures 
against the accuser, or hide future bad behaviour, or all of 
these (Rubenstein 2007). The history of corporate regulation 
provides many examples of these problems.
Second, even given a marked power inequality, it is barely 
possible to hold a culprit to his (or her, or its) responsibili-
ties—by which I mean, to ensure that the agent actually acts 
and responds as he (or she, or it) is meant to. Notwithstand-
ing the difficulties just mentioned, a powerful and cred-
ible threat of sanctions certainly represents an incentive to 
change behaviour. However, altering some incentives facing 
an actor does not, in itself, alter other factors that generate an 
agent’s readiness to act badly. Notoriously, many corporate 
actors seem to view fines as a cost of doing business. In 
other words, the underlying regulatory norm is not internal-
ised as having any validity in its own right; the fine may have 
some effect, but the norm remains external to the actual poli-
cies and procedures of the organisation. In such cases, accu-
sations tend to generate ill-will, obfuscation, and counter-
allegations; sanctions rarely lead to improvement and often 
have unwanted effects, not least in terms of the resources that 
the accuser must use to impose them; more intensive meas-
ures, like sending in regulatory staff to monitor behaviour 
13 See the section titled, ‘Practical Implications of Limited Abili-
ties to Act Well (II): Reasons Versus (Prospective) Responsibilities’, 
which argues for the collective dimension of these tasks and that indi-
vidual reasoning relies on this.
9 Watson notes the difficulty and contends that we must respond to 
such agents broadly as if they were responsible, condemning the acts 
and acting to limit the damage they might cause; but, he argues, these 
responses ‘lack their normal expressive function’ (2004, p. 281). See 
also Smith (2008) and Hieronymi (2007) against the idea that inabil-
ity implies non-culpability.
10 In the final section, I will offer a different explanation as to why 
we may respond with more vigour to the wrongdoing of more virtu-
ous agents.
11 In another context (that of moral motivation), Herman suggests 
that it can be helpful to approach a conceptual puzzle as a practical 
one (2007, p. 266). I think the wisdom of this maxim owes to the fact 
that practical difficulties can reveal a mistaken theoretical frame. In 
my context: what looks like a theoretical difficulty (are these incor-
rigible wrongdoers responsible?) is more aptly framed as a practical 
one (how are we to interact with those persons and organisations?).
12 Compare the oft-cited historical example of criminal trials against 
animals, from rats to pigs to insects (Girgen 2003).
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on a daily basis, require considerable energy and attention, 
and their results are unlikely to be uplifting. Rewards for 
approved forms of activity—such as tax breaks or less strin-
gent monitoring—may seem more constructive, insofar as 
they are less likely to cause ill-will or evasion. Again, how-
ever, unless the agent actually endorses the norm that moti-
vates others to offer these benefits, improved conduct will 
always remain contingent on the threat of their withdrawal; 
we can expect only the required minimum, or even feigned 
compliance.
However tasty the carrot and however big the stick, then, 
it is surprisingly difficult to find measures that exceed the 
effectiveness of mere words—be they exhortations to do bet-
ter or words of blame and protest. Yet ‘mere words’ have 
their risks too, since every agent has reasons to be jealous of 
its standing and reputation. Hence even the most powerful 
regulatory agencies face continual frustrations—difficulties 
in detecting and confronting wrongdoing, the ineffectiveness 
or perverse effects of available penalties, the encounter with 
aggressive counter-tactics that challenge or undermine their 
authority, the feeling of playing Whac-a-Mole—that is, the 
sense that if one tackles one sort of malfeasance, it is sadly 
predictable that another sort will pop up elsewhere. As indi-
viduals in everyday relationships or within organisations, 
we should be equally familiar with these problems. Even 
more than regulators, who after all are somewhat insulated 
from the effects of companies’ malfeasance, we often feel 
the need to hold someone responsible and the impossibil-
ity of doing so. ‘Least said, soonest mended’, we mutter 
to ourselves, as we let slide an infraction by someone we 
care about or have no choice but to associate with. As most 
managers can testify, formal superiority does little to alter 
the basic dynamics, at least where one relies on ongoing 
cooperation and cannot simply banish the offending actor 
and costlessly replace him. The problem is: how to really 
make contact with the basic policies, motivations, and moral 
sense of an agent who, thus far, has proved unwilling to live 
up to the responsibilities that one believes he (or she, or it) 
should accept?
Notwithstanding the difficulties and frustrations bound up 
with the various ways we attempt to ‘hold responsible’, we 
should also note the more fruitful possibilities. In philoso-
phers’ language, these depend on our achieving some shared 
sense of the moral and practical reasons involved. For a rare 
example of blame that proves entirely constructive, think 
of Jane Austen’s Emma, admonished by Mr Knightley for 
her cruelty toward Miss Bates at that unforgettable picnic 
on Box Hill.14 Emma immediately feels the force and fair-
ness of Mr Knightley’s rebuke. The relationships between all 
those involved are deepened; moral considerations are better 
appreciated. But we should also remember that Emma is a 
heroine—capable of self-deceit but basically honest with 
herself, spirited but fundamentally concerned for others, 
willing to question Mr Knightley’s judgment but fully able 
to appreciate his character and integrity. I say this not to 
express doubt about the capacity of some corporations to 
respond to accusations and adverse responses in an analo-
gous way, and much important work has been done on the 
appropriate strategies (e.g. Braithwaite 2011, 2015; Bovens 
1998; Fisse and Braithwaite 1993). Nonetheless, once things 
have gone wrong enough for a company to create significant 
harms or breach important regulatory standards, I think it 
is fair to say that it will require as much luck as judgment 
to elicit a constructive response. After all, we know that 
organisational change tends to be a fraught process, and that 
policies and commitments do not change overnight.15
In more general terms, the point is that holding responsi-
ble tends to prove an exercise in frustration and even futility 
unless we make contact with an agent’s ability and willing-
ness to take responsibility. The less responsible an agent is, 
in the sense of lacking the virtues required to appreciate and 
act on the relevant considerations, the harder this will prove. 
But when there is some sort of success, what actually occurs 
is a form of joint action. The accuser takes responsibility by 
confronting the culprit, as opposed to merely ignoring the 
wrong or putting up with the problem.16 The culprit takes 
responsibility by acknowledging its fault, as opposed (for 
example) to merely paying the fine and hoping to get away 
with similar (mis)conduct in future. If the culprit offers 
compensation, apology, or commitments not to repeat the 
offence, it then falls to the accuser to accept these—perhaps 
with some further response, conditions, or concessions. In 
14 Jane Austen, Emma [1815], ch. 43 (or Vol. III, ch. VII depending 
on the edition).
15 To illustrate the point, note two recent examples of companies’ 
responses to grave problems in their supply chain. Apple and H&M 
both have many virtues; both have acknowledged their responsibility 
to address the issues; and both have been praised for their responses. 
But in the years since scandals first came to public notice, the com-
panies have made only partial progress—not least, because they con-
tinue to place incompatible demands on suppliers (on the one hand, 
rapid, lowest-cost production; on the other, safe and humane work-
ing conditions). See, e.g., China Labor Watch (2017), Clean Clothes 
Campaign et al. (2016), and Preston and Leffler (2016).
16 This aspect of accusation is well stressed by Goodhart. He refers 
to ‘anti-sweatshop and other global justice activists [as] taking 
responsibility for injustice even though they do not, in either the phil-
osophical sense or the prevailing conventional sense, have it [that is, 
they are not to blame for the problems they are highlighting—GW]. 
The very point of their activism is to educate people about the impli-
cations of their choices and habits, to try to change popular thinking 
so that consumers begin to regard themselves and others as responsi-
ble for the effects of their behavior. They are seeking to change con-
ventions, not as a way of discharging responsibility [that is, their own 
guilt or culpability—GW] but in hopes of pinning the blame where 
they believe it belongs’ (2017, p. 191).
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these ways, accuser and culprit share responsibility: they act 
together to craft a worthwhile response to the original wrong 
and find ways to put it behind them.17 I have emphasised that 
the process is rarely as uncomplicated as Emma’s accept-
ance of Mr Knightley’s rebuke, and resolutions rarely as 
quick and uncontentious. Nonetheless, to prove constructive 
‘holding responsible’ cannot be something merely done to 
the culprit: the parties must act together, in a shared taking 
of responsibility.
To put the same point in terms of my central concern with 
enablements and restrictions: practices of holding respon-
sible may well seem restrictive—after all, they mean that 
agents cannot simply act as the moment takes them, with-
out liability to adverse responses from others. At their best, 
however, they enable agents to share responsibility: to create 
a shared acknowledgement that some mode of conduct is 
unacceptable; to foster the will and the means to avoid its 
recurrence; to make reparations and repair relationships; and 
even to strengthen schemes of cooperation.
Practical Implications of Limited Abilities 
to Act Well (II): Reasons Versus (Prospective) 
Responsibilities
Underlying the question of what it means, in practice, to hold 
an agent responsible is a second difficulty: how to decide the 
standards an actor should be judged by. As pointed out in the 
introduction, any assignment of retrospective responsibility, 
be it blame, sanctions, or some other measure, must invoke a 
claim about prospective responsibilities—that is, it will rest 
on assumptions or assertions about what the actor ought to 
do and to have done. Among other problems, I have been 
pointing out that we should not assume a shared sense of 
right and wrong between accuser and culprit. Such disagree-
ments represent a major practical obstacle for any attempt 
to hold responsible that goes beyond mere hard treatment 
by a more powerful agent.18 Disputes about corporate 
responsibilities and appropriate regulation illustrate the 
point all too well.
Contemporary philosophical talk of (responsiveness to) 
reasons tends to obscure this problem. The language of rea-
sons is highly abstract; moreover, reasons are meant to be 
out there, waiting to be discovered, apparent to any rational 
mind. But as is obvious when we think about corporate regu-
lation, consensus is a fragile achievement and disagreement 
to be expected. I suggest it is better to frame the matter in 
terms of responsibilities instead. This suggestion may seem 
unfortunate, since it brings another cognate of ‘responsible’ 
into play.19 However, I see two arguments for making this 
shift. Both bring us closer to the problems and realities of 
corporate regulation, as well as to the specific duties that 
individuals bear, as citizens or employees or other role-
holders. And both help us to see the mutual enablement and 
sharing of responsibility involved when agents arrive at a 
common sense of the standards and roles that they should 
live up to.
One reason for speaking of responsibilities rather than 
reasons is that it reminds us that the relevant normative con-
siderations vary between agents, be they individual persons 
or organisations. Responsibilities must be divided, allocated, 
and taken up. We expect all agents20 to abide by certain 
minimum standards—law, regulation, and everyday moral-
ity all have a crucial role in stipulating these. But a central 
aspect of human freedom lies in our ability to choose which 
roles and responsibilities to take on, and even to carve these 
out as our personal vocation. This applies equally to insti-
tutions. Economic and political freedom consist partly in 
the endeavour to create, maintain, and reconfigure various 
forms of collective action. Decent organisations, like decent 
people, exercise initiative and commitment not just in car-
rying out their responsibilities, but also in defining them. A 
successful business corporation will build up a distinctive 
internal culture and external reputation; it will specialise in 
particular products or services, developing ways to deliver 
these reliably and competitively. The organisation carves out 
a particular role for itself, defining its responsibilities vis-à-
vis customers and suppliers and employees. As I will stress 
shortly, these responsibilities are not set in stone. But they 
still represent meaningful commitments, which both insiders 
and outsiders expect the organisation to live up to.
As a result, no one supposes that any actual or ideal divi-
sion of responsibilities could be specified by Reason, capi-
tal R. (One might read Plato’s Republic as illustrating the 
17 Having said that this interactive aspect of responsibility rarely 
features in philosophical accounts, I should also note important 
exceptions. Walker (2006) has stressed the variety of possible 
responses and the range of parties who might cooperate to create 
these. McGeer’s recent work (2012, 2015a) is also noteworthy, as is 
McKenna’s (2012) image of holding responsible as a ‘conversation’ 
between accuser and accused.
18 Apart from moral objections to hard treatment, simply as such, 
we might recall the familiar difficulties of inflicting it on collective 
agents. ‘No soul to damn and no body to kick’, in the maxim made 
famous by Coffee Jr. (1981). While there may be ‘assets to seize’, we 
know how easily such penalties are passed on to those with no part 
in the original wrongdoing. See also Fisse and Braithwaite’s classic 
discussion (1993, esp. 41  ff, 82  ff, 140  ff), which highlights many 
options that avoid or minimise such difficulties.
19 Or to put the point in more positive terms: it can help us to see 
how the different meanings of responsibility are related, as I will 
summarise in conclusion.
20 That is, all agents of a particular type: obviously the basic norms 
differ, depending on whether we consider a state or a church, a busi-
ness corporation or an individual person.
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despotism inherent in deciding such matters by solitary rea-
soning (Arendt 1968) or, alternatively, as an ironical reduc-
tio of the attempt.) These are social and political matters, 
involving imagination, freedom, negotiation, contestation, 
compromise, and adaptation to circumstances. As such, they 
have an essentially historical aspect. Whatever timeless Rea-
son pronounces, human beings can only create a division of 
responsibilities by adjusting the one that they already have. 
No doubt, there are well-reasoned criteria to steer our delib-
erations as we try to judge what might count as an improve-
ment, such as justice, stability, or welfare. But what allows 
more abstract ideals to guide action—and hence enables 
constructive interaction—is a broadly accepted sense of the 
responsibilities and freedoms belonging to different actors. 
We see this within large organisations, where an accepted 
sense of the powers and duties of different role-holders and 
departments empowers them to play their parts—and, in 
turn, constitutes a functioning collective actor.21 And we 
see it at the wider level of interaction between corporations 
and other actors. A critical task of regulation, just like that 
of other forms of law and social norms and customs, is to 
specify the scope of legitimate action and initiative for dif-
ferent actors. When agents act in line with shared knowledge 
of who is entitled to do what, a whole host of potential frus-
trations is eliminated; trust and cooperation are deepened. 
Differently put: what is required of a responsible agent is not 
responsiveness to reasons in the abstract; instead, a respon-
sible agent must show responsiveness to this framework 
of responsibilities and the ways that other agents act and 
respond within it.22
A second point follows from the fact that such frame-
works are sustained out of action and initiative. Like the 
wider circumstances in which they are situated, they are 
never fixed or final. Many responsibilities, for individuals, 
for role-holders, for business corporations, and for other 
organisations, have been worked out over a long period. 
So they represent fairly stable reference points for practi-
cal judgment, providing an anchor in terms of each agent’s 
specific purposes or goals, and the criteria by which actions 
and outcomes should be judged. But these responsibilities 
invariably leave problems to be addressed and are open to 
contest in various ways. As I have noted, reason implies 
something an agent can undertake alone, or at least the tidy 
consensus of rational minds, marred only by the errors of 
the irrational. But responsible agents know that they must 
live with disagreement, uncertainty, and change; they know 
how events can easily disrupt even the best-established divi-
sion of roles and responsibilities; they know that mistakes 
can be expected, and also that it often proves unclear whose 
mistake it was. A business corporation may find its market 
disappearing as new technologies emerge, for example, and 
have to redefine its offerings and role in the marketplace. Or 
a company may find that it has become reliant on suppliers 
whose practices are unsustainable or unjust, and face fierce 
criticism (whether from inside or outside) for this. Resolving 
such problems and the disagreements that often ensue tends 
to be a matter of negotiating and creating a more satisfy-
ing complementarity of roles and expectations, rather than 
deciding who got it wrong.23
Some readers may baulk at my talk of complementarity 
and responsibilities in the context of business corporations, 
where we hear so much about competition and self-interest. I 
am stressing that responsibilities belong to broader schemes 
of cooperation, which need to be developed and agreed, and 
thereby enable the different actors involved. But this does 
not mean that different agents must pursue a shared goal or 
even deliberately cooperate, let alone reach a miraculous 
consensus. It means only that their responsibilities should 
mesh within a larger framework. I already mentioned the 
complementarity of roles within a reasonably functional 
organisation. Directors’ and employees’ parts must add up 
to a whole. But they will also involve opposing priorities: 
those of a safety officer may well conflict with those of the 
financial accountant, for example. This point applies equally 
to market competition. Market actors have a responsibility 
to compete, in fact, and not just an interest in acting com-
petitively. Indeed, in another sense they have no interest in 
competing, since the freedom of suppliers and buyers to go 
elsewhere constitutes a major constraint upon a corporation’s 
ability to set terms and prices.24 We have seen the result of 
this whenever ‘anti-trust’ regimes have been weakened, in 
the US and elsewhere: competitor firms are liable to merge 
or buy one another out, leaving a market dominated by a 
very few actors, so that suppliers or buyers lack meaningful 
options. This sort of market concentration may serve corpo-
rate interests all too well, as may other forms of cartelisation 
21 At the risk of overusing the term ‘constitute’, let me note the 
political parallel: a constitution lays down the responsibilities of leg-
islature, executive, and judiciary, and thereby constitutes the state. 
Interestingly, this lesson stems from the early modern experience of 
corporations, where the charter played a similar role (Ciepley 2017).
22 Similarly for an agent who judges or responds to another. In one 
sense, this is a matter of her (or its) individual agency and reasoning. 
(I blame him; the regulator criticises the company, and so on.) I am 
emphasising the context in which such judgments make sense, and 
how the underlying reasoning of the agents must begin from some 
existing social division of responsibilities, even if it takes critical dis-
tance from them.
23 This dimension is highlighted by Young (2011) in her ‘social con-
nection model’ of responsibility.
24 Just to make the point explicit, as regards my broad theme that 
apparent restrictions can represent important enablements. Competi-
tion prevents monopoly and its power to squeeze suppliers and milk 
customers. As advocates of markets often remind us, it also enables 
innovation, efficiency, and choice.
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and collusion. But the basic structure of meaningful com-
petition has been lost. In other words, we should remember 
the parallel with other rule-governed forms of competition—
thus many games, or the legal contest between defence and 
prosecution, or constitutional checks and balances. Although 
it would be strange to speak of these actors cooperating, 
simply as such, we cannot understand their responsibilities 
without reference to a wider scheme of cooperation, which 
renders their competing activities complementary and not 
merely conflictual.
Against the Question, ‘Is the Agent (Really) 
Responsible?’
In the last two sections, I have highlighted two achievements 
that are central to our practices of responsibility. On the 
one hand, agents need to arrive at a working division of 
responsibilities. This will include some common responsi-
bilities, such as regulation lays down for actors who engage 
in specific modes of economic activity, or law and everyday 
morality lay down for individual persons. It also involves 
differentiation: the specific responsibilities that individu-
als and organisations bear, in terms of particular roles (as a 
business corporation, as a lawyer, and so on) and in terms 
of particular commitments (as this corporation, with these 
employees and this track record; as this lawyer, with these 
clients; and so forth).
On the other, responsible agents must find modes of 
joint action to address failings—including ways to hold one 
another responsible. Such responses will certainly include 
punitive measures, at least so far as power relations permit, 
in order to insist on certain basic standards and to hinder 
those actors who are unable or unwilling to play even a 
minimal role of their own accord. I have stressed how dif-
ficult these practices are—how much friction they involve, 
how often ‘mere words’ prove costly, how limited carrot 
and stick are bound to be. More constructive possibilities, 
by contrast, rest on cooperation that clarifies responsibilities 
and fosters their acceptance by all involved. There must be 
agents who bear, or who are willing to take, responsibility 
for pointing out when others fail to do their parts (albeit with 
the awareness that it is sometimes hard to decide whether 
the agent is at fault or whether supposed responsibilities 
have been wrongly judged or ascribed). If the overall scheme 
of cooperation is not to falter, there must emerge a new or 
renewed resolve to divide responsibilities in a particular way 
that fosters active commitment and requires only sparing use 
of sanctions.25 To suppose that an agent can literally be held 
to her responsibilities—that is, be somehow forced to fulfil 
what some other agent sees as her responsibilities—is to 
be misled by language, or even tempted to tyranny. Agents 
must take responsibility and make those responsibilities 
their own.
In terms of the philosophical puzzle about capacities, I 
have suggested that degrees of culpability do not relate to 
degrees of capability in any simple way, and certainly not 
as if less able agents were less culpable for their misdeeds. 
One problem is the mistaken abstraction involved in treat-
ing culpability as a scalar property. This makes too much of 
the fact that there can be more or less harsh responses and 
not enough of the variety of responses open to us. As indi-
viduals, we may blame or avoid or alter relations or demand 
compensation or even punish, depending not only on the 
wrong but also on our assessment of the wrongdoer. Regula-
tors and policymakers, not to mention consumers and NGOs, 
may similarly reach for a whole range of different measures, 
depending on their powers and assessment of the culprit, 
case, and context.26
A related problem arises from the failure to appreciate 
the enabling character of attempts to ensure that norma-
tive standards govern other agents’ conduct, as well as our 
own. Other philosophers have recently made similar points: 
both Vargas (2013) and McGeer (2015b), for example, have 
argued that practices of responsibility provide a ‘moral 
scaffolding’ or ‘moral ecology’ for our agency. That is, 
capacities to act decently are bolstered when those around 
us endorse defensible norms, and are willing to remind us 
of them and to respond critically to us if we fail to abide 
by them—or, more happily, to reward and enable us when 
we act well. Instead of picturing responsible agents as pos-
sessing an independent capacity to respond to reasons, the 
emphasis shifts to abilities to participate and respond to 
others’ responses, and to the ways in which these interac-
tions can develop abilities to act responsibly. Of course, 
25 This is merely to telegraph a point that has been made with great 
thoroughness by Braithwaite in his account of ‘responsive’ or ‘restor-
ative’ regulation. (For summary, see his 2011.) This advocates gradu-
ated or ‘pyramidal’ sanctions in the aim to bolstering organisational 
capacities to act well, rather than merely deterring. Just putting an 
agent ‘on notice’ may well be enough, in the better cases, to lead it 
to actively take responsibility. If this fails, and increasingly stronger 
measures fail too, this implies that an agent does not really accept, or 
is otherwise incapable, of meeting a particular duty. As such, it is not 
fit to participate in a scheme of cooperation that requires such stand-
ards—so it may be apt to withdraw its licence for particular business 
activities, or even to consider the ‘corporate death penalty.’
Footnote 25 (continued)
26 In passing, note that it would represent a parallel mistake to sup-
pose that agents’ normative abilities can be ranked on a scale—as if 
there were a single ability to respond to reasons rather than a range 
of capacities and skills and sensitivities involved in recognising our 
responsibilities, living up to them, and responding to other agents. 
This may be even more true of corporate agents than of individuals, 
since there are so many ways that organisations may be structured and 
staffed, not to mention guided by other agents.
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for various purposes we may still wish to distinguish agen-
tial capacities from surrounding conditions. But corporate 
agency, like other artificial forms of agency, demonstrates 
how profoundly agents’ capacities are bound up with the 
affordances and constraints surrounding them. (For example, 
as noted in the previous section, the vital role of competition 
to the good functioning of most corporate actors and sec-
tors.) Hence my suggestion that capacities for responsible 
conduct are constitutively tied to practices of responsibility, 
by which I mean both the collective enterprise of deciding 
which agent bears which responsibilities and the sharing 
of responsibility involved when agents hold one another 
responsible.27
Corporate Regulation as Enabling
The previous sections recall some familiar problems of reg-
ulation and its enforcement alongside some more abstract 
questions about responsibility. In this final section, I con-
sider what they can tell us about how corporate regulation 
can play an enabling role, and not merely a restrictive one. 
The largest problem for this suggestion lies in the fact that 
restriction and enablement are relative quantities: they can 
only be assessed in terms of wishes and intentions, purposes 
and capacities. Readers of this journal will need no remind-
ing how vexed it is, to ascribe these to business corporations. 
I will not try to scale this peak in a few paragraphs, but 
I do think some helpful pointers follow from the previous 
discussion.
One is that business activities, however competitive, also 
belong to a cooperative framework: this can be more or less 
hospitable or hostile to corporations’ activities, interests, and 
purposes, however those are finally judged. Surrounded by 
many other actors who may decide whether to trust it, to buy 
or sell from it, to compete with it, or to publicise or praise or 
protest its activities, a corporation depends on its reputation 
and its capacities to sustain credible commitments. A similar 
point applies to the members of these complex organisa-
tions, who are bound to seek a range of commitments from 
it and to take different views of the priorities and interests 
that it ought to serve.28 In other words, unitary ascriptions 
of purposes or interests—profitability or shareholder value, 
for example—are misleading, since many different criteria 
will be deployed by different agents. In one sense, this means 
that my question permits no a priori answer: a regulatory 
requirement is almost inevitably bound to be constraining in 
terms of some interests or purposes and enabling in terms of 
others.29 In another sense, it means that any judgment about 
enablements or restrictions is inherently normative—that is, 
it must invoke claims about the proper purposes that busi-
ness corporations should serve, how their interests should be 
defined, and the relative priority of those interests to those 
of other agents. Again, those questions are largely beyond 
my scope, except to underline two points.
First, constructive forms of interaction depend on some 
degree of agreement about the respective responsibilities 
of different agents. As I have emphasised, attempts to hold 
responsible always invoke views on the responsibilities that 
an agent ought to bear. Disagreements about those respon-
sibilities are bound to spill over into contests about blame, 
reputation, and penalties. What regulation provides, in this 
context, is an anchor point for judgment and responses—
though not, of course, the final word on corporate respon-
sibilities. This is true both from the point of view of other 
agents who are deciding how to interact with a corporation 
and from the point of view of the corporation itself. Insofar 
as it abides by publicly recognised rules, a corporation is 
well placed to rebut some demands as unreasonable.30 Or 
to put the same point more positively, it is entitled to the 
rewards of recognition and cooperation; it wins a ‘licence to 
operate’. Of course, those standards may still be disputed and 
(as I will stress in a moment) more responsible agents may 
wish to go beyond them in all sorts of ways. But debating 
and revising those standards is a responsibility shared with 
other bodies, such as legislatures, regulatory agencies, and 
NGOs. In short, a sound regulatory context means that no 
corporation is expected to act or judge entirely on its own 
account or to respond as such.
To see how much of an enablement this is, compare our 
personal experiences of blame. We do not defend ourselves 
against an accusation by reasoning from first principles 
28 In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the intentional states 
we attribute to collective agents need to be the same as those of all 
or some members, just to point out that the collectivity will serve a 
range of different purposes so far as those members are concerned.
29 Cf note 24 on the ways in which competition enables and restricts.
30 At a more abstract level, we can express this point in terms of 
Searle’s well-known distinction between regulative and constitutive 
rules (1995, pp.  43–48). Some rules govern activities that are con-
ceivable without them; other rules constitute new modes of activity, 
just as the rules of chess actually define the game or rules of exchange 
constitute trade. One might suppose that corporate regulation, as the 
word suggests, merely regulates—standards for product safety regu-
late manufacturing and sales, hence presuppose abilities to make and 
sell. However, like other legal norms, regulations also have an impor-
tant constitutive dimension. That is, they constitute some actions as 
publically unacceptable, hence meriting authoritative intervention, 
and some as publically acceptable, hence entitled to non-interference 
or even approval.
27 And to spell out one implication relating to my opening perplex-
ity about capability and culpability: if normative ability—or rather, 
abilities—are partly formed and maintained by practices of holding 
responsible, then they clearly cannot serve as an independent basis for 
justifying those practices (Williams 2016).
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that it rests on an unjustified view of our duties. Instead, 
we invoke familiar social expectations, the responsibili-
ties belonging to our roles, or well-recognised qualities of 
character and action. Those everyday standards may not be 
perfectly defined (we know sometimes societies have gone 
very badly wrong in defining them; we know that changing 
circumstances and conflicting initiatives are always liable to 
demand revisions). Indeed, we often learn about their imper-
fections when we encounter accusations from others and 
realise, perhaps quite painfully, that something is awry. But 
I have been suggesting that a key form of social cooperation 
is involved in reaching at least a working definition. This 
enables us to go about our business with some assurance 
that we are entitled to others’ forbearance and cooperation; 
it provides sufficient everyday agreement for us to raise and 
deal with particular disagreements.
Second, as I noted at the end of the previous section, 
our agency and purposes are profoundly shaped by these 
expectations. For a well-socialised human being, most 
moral demands do not feel especially restrictive, because 
our agency has a certain degree of unity: our desires and 
inclinations are not at war with one another; they cohere 
with our own moral sense and our sense of what we should 
be doing with our lives. In other words, our agency is partly 
constituted by our responsibilities. The same is true for an 
organisation that has learned to accept certain standards: it 
takes these up into its structures and procedures and culture. 
No doubt, it will still experience incentives to break some of 
these, just as even the best of us is still sometimes tempted to 
do wrong. Likewise, it is quite possible that a virtuous agent 
(be it a person or a corporation) will make mistakes—in 
which case, however, the agent is in a reasonable position to 
recognise the justice of accusations, to make amends and put 
things back on track. In such cases, other agents’ attempts 
to hold it responsible will be accepted, perhaps with some 
misgivings and friction, as enabling it act more responsibly.
Compare this with the continual difficulties faced by an 
irresponsible agent, one that makes only token acknowledge-
ment of some responsibilities and standards (half-hearted 
procedures, a weak compliance department, mission state-
ments that are more PR than policy). In such cases, the ena-
bling aspect falters: responsible conduct will always be a 
struggle; the organisation will always be liable to the opposi-
tion and mistrust that irresponsible conduct rightly attracts. 
For such an organisation, some regulations are bound to 
seem like restrictions and some will prove ineffective in 
guiding its activities. For other agents to enforce the letter 
of the law requires constant and exhausting vigilance, not to 
mention a power position that regulators often lack. To recall 
the philosophical puzzle about capability and culpability: 
this is not to say that attempts to hold responsible will be out 
of order. Quite the reverse: regulatory sanctions, pressure by 
consumers and consumer organisations, protests by activists 
and NGO’s—all will count as important contributions to 
upholding reasonable claims about corporations’ responsi-
bilities and enabling companies to do better and to become 
the sorts of agents that can really call themselves socially 
responsible. They create material and reputational incen-
tives; they strengthen the hand of more responsible mem-
bers and departments within the company; they increase the 
salience of responsibilities that might otherwise be ignored. 
But the enabling character of these efforts will be harder to 
make out.
It is also worth underscoring the collective dimension of 
this problem. Evoking the image of rule-governed competi-
tion, regulation is sometimes pictured as creating a ‘level-
playing field’. This points to a straightforward way in which 
regulation enables. For corporate agents who want to act 
responsibly, codified regulations and corresponding sanc-
tions represent an important assurance mechanism. They 
lessen the risks that a business will become uncompetitive 
if it lives up to certain standards, insofar as other companies 
cannot undercut it by taking shortcuts or externalising costs. 
The other side of this point is that widespread irresponsibil-
ity and frequent misconduct can trap all parties. Fouls and 
gamesmanship can hardly be addressed where low standards 
are the rule and infringements are the order of the day. To 
shame a whole business sector requires strong and concerted 
outrage, across publics and media and political fora. This is 
bound to be hard to sustain when many other problems com-
pete for attention, as our news cycles testify daily. By con-
trast, when most corporations in a market sector live up to 
reasonable standards, efforts to hold miscreants responsible 
can be more focussed and are more likely to prove effective. 
Debates about corporate social responsibility often demon-
strate the difficulty of judging whether abiding by certain 
standards would really be in the interests of a company, or 
indeed of defining those interests when short- and long-term 
incentives conflict. The shape of those calculations shifts 
considerably, though, where reasonable regulatory standards 
and widespread compliance are the norm—so that spaces 
between short and long term, between conduct and reputa-
tion, do not open into outright gulfs.
As well as enabling more responsible conduct across the 
field, widely shared standards open up another important 
dimension of freedom: the ability to define and shape one’s 
responsibilities. As Mayer (2013) argues, there is and should 
be scope for more responsible corporations to define their 
own roles and responsibilities, in ways that go beyond regu-
latory standards. Apart from a business context that ensures 
such efforts will not be penalised, the other precondition for 
this is that such agents really must be more responsible: with 
abilities to make commitments, to define these in socially 
acceptable ways, and to consistently live up to them. Again, 
we can compare this point with the artificial perplexity about 
capability and culpability. It is indeed true that more capable 
Regulation Enables: Corporate Agency and Practices of Responsibility 
1 3
agents will judge themselves against higher standards. But I 
would argue that this is simply part of what it is to be more 
able. Only where an agent has grasped the point and value 
of a responsibility will it be fully capable of instituting the 
measures needed to live up to it and meaningfully evaluating 
its own performance. (Compare the tick-box approach that a 
merely adequate company might take to non-discrimination 
law or fair trade standards.) It is also part of what it is to 
enjoy a good reputation. When we hear of malfeasance by 
some corporations, we may feel dismay but not surprise. 
For those that have built up a reputation for reliability and 
responsibility, similar infractions may attract more outrage. 
From one point of view, this may seem unfair (why should 
similar wrongs attract different responses?). From another, 
however, it just marks the standing of a trustworthy organi-
sation—that it will act to sustain its reputation; that closer 
cooperation poses fewer risks; that stakeholders of every 
stripe can count on it (‘expect better’, as we sometimes say); 
that it is less risky or costly to criticise it; and, above all, that 
it will respond quickly and appropriately if it gets things 
wrong.
In other words, regulatory standards provide an impor-
tant background against which more responsible corpora-
tions can define their own roles and gain the benefits—at 
all sorts of levels—of more active cooperation that come 
with that. Doubtless, regulation will pose some frustrations 
even for these actors—who do not need to be told about 
and checked for basic standards, for whom the good (or the 
acceptable minimum) may sometimes be an enemy of the 
best. Nonetheless, to the extent that regulation can hinder 
their undercutting by less responsible actors, to the extent 
that they can endorse its spirit even if not its every letter, 
it still counts as a genuine enablement for them. Equally, 
they can play a constructive role in debates about regula-
tory standards, and indeed self-regulation, in a way that less 
responsible actors cannot.31
Last—but perhaps most important of all—my argument 
suggests that regulations governing specific forms of busi-
ness activity must be set alongside provisions that shape the 
capacities and responsiveness of business corporations, sim-
ply as such. The extent to which companies are able to offer 
more than the most grudging compliance with regulations, 
like the extent to which they are able to meaningfully judge 
or debate their responsibilities, depends on how far they 
are trustworthy organisations.32 A whole range of different 
measures are relevant here, and I mention just a few33: 
legal provisions for incorporation can foster more respon-
sive governance structures (compare the oft-cited example 
of employee representation within German corporations); 
various measures can discourage executive autocracy (for 
instance, by enabling staff to protest policies and initiatives 
that they believe are ill-advised, illegal, or immoral (Bovens 
1998)); there are many ways to promote self-knowledge and 
counteract misinformation, including reporting and audit 
requirements and trustworthy organisations to monitor these 
(so that different parts of the organisation are transparent 
to one another, and executives are aware of the actions and 
policies of various departments or subsidiaries34); not least, 
measures to prevent market concentration and cartelisation 
ensure that both suppliers and customers have fair choice, 
so that companies are less able to dictate terms.35 Such 
provisions may look like restrictions and have sometimes 
been opposed in the name of market freedom.36 Indeed, it 
is no part of my argument to deny that they have restrictive 
aspects. Even where they do not specifically constitute a new 
form of activity, however, they also represent enablements: 
34 As Braithwaite remarks, employers often ‘have good strategies for 
protecting themselves from day-to-day knowledge of their organiza-
tion’s failures to meet its legal obligations. The primary function of 
restorative inspection is therefore simply to squarely draw the atten-
tion of chief executives to these failures... Deterrence is only needed 
in cases where this restorative approach repeatedly fails’ (2015, 
p. 165).
35 One might also mention measures to ensure that directors do not 
face excessive pressure from single constituencies. ‘Accountability’ 
sounds like a good thing, but if just one set of stakeholders can insist 
on its claims, then these claims can easily become unreasonable, 
jeopardise other goals, and undermine capacities for responsibility. 
Restrictions on trade union protests were once justified in this way. 
Of more contemporary relevance is the doctrine of shareholder value, 
which has often led to short-termism and undermined the corporation 
as a long-term contributor to prosperity (Stout 2012).
36 With regard to the language of free markets, it is worth noting 
that corporate markets are not free in any straightforward sense. As 
organisations and legal actors, business corporations are constituted 
by their charters and the legal provisions that allow them to come into 
being; these impose constraints on their members as well as on every-
one who may be affected by corporate activities. Like other rules and 
regulations mentioned here, these restrictions also enable: they con-
stitute a new form of business enterprise and facilitate its activities, 
creating freedoms, opportunities, and powers that go much beyond 
the classical liberal rights to property and contract. See further North 
et al. (2009) and Ciepley (2013).
31 Lane (2005) nicely stresses the importance of corporations engag-
ing in wider debate about the regulations and norms by which they 
should be guided—as well as how difficult this task may be for them.
32 As Pettit has commented, we would be—and indeed have been—
unwise to permit such entities to come into being: ‘[I]t would seem 
to be a serious design fault, at least from the viewpoint of society 
as a whole, to allow any group agents to avoid making evaluations 
[about the relative value of the options they face]. Why should any 
group of individuals be allowed to incorporate under a constitution 
that deprives it of the ability to evaluate its options and that ensures, 
therefore, that it will not be fit to be held responsible for what it 
chooses?’ (2007, p.  187). I have suggested that Pettit’s final ‘there-
fore’ should be read as a matter of practical implications, rather than 
a strictly conceptual entailment.
Footnote 32 (continued)
33 For a careful treatment of this vital topic, see Bovens (1998, espe-
cially the chapters in Part III).
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they create or foster abilities that we have no right to count 
on in their absence.
Conclusion
With our more practical hats on, such as we must wear when 
we confront corporations and their formidable powers, I 
have suggested that some important aspects of responsibil-
ity come to the fore—aspects that philosophers tend to lose 
sight of when they focus on the capacities and actions of the 
wrongdoer, or culpability as an abstract quality. Disagree-
ments about the role and importance of regulation remind 
us of the profoundly social nature of moral and practical 
demands, and the many forms of action and cooperation 
involved in practices of holding responsible. To understand 
responsibility, we should not focus only on the question of 
what a particular agent can do, be it an individual or collec-
tive actor, or on its culpability, considered in the abstract. We 
also need to consider what a plurality of agents can achieve 
together. Regulatory standards, like other ways of defining 
and upholding norms and responsibilities, represent a crucial 
way in which agents can act together to enable cooperation, 
responsibility, and initiative.
We know that dealing with many of our corporations 
is incredibly hard work: they are, one might say, rather 
like overgrown children whose capacities for responsibil-
ity still need to be developed—capacities for self-control, 
self-knowledge, and long-term planning; abilities to handle 
many responsibilities at once, to appreciate the demands 
of their role amid a complex division of labour, to actively 
reshape that role with initiative and commitment. This irre-
sponsibility has only been encouraged by the framing of 
regulation as red tape—restrictions and hindrances that need 
to be cut through, removed, or avoided in the name of effi-
ciency or enterprise. (There may be many places where we 
could do with better regulation, but ‘better’ is no synonym 
for ‘less’.) The problem we face is not the idle theoretical 
one of whether some corporations are ‘really’ responsible 
for their irresponsible conduct.37 The problem, rather, is just 
their irresponsibility—that is, the relative inability of some 
corporations to act well and the corollary of this inability, 
their tendency to act badly. I have not dwelt, here, on the 
most obvious difficulties that this causes, such as damage 
to public health, communities, or environments. But I have 
emphasised a more timeless problem, one that seems to me 
unduly neglected in the philosophy of responsibility: the 
task of upholding and adjudicating a reasonable framework 
of cooperation. Above all, I have sought to emphasise the 
enabling power of such a framework, including the enabling 
role of regulation in the corporate context.
As a final note, let me summarise how the different senses 
of responsibility come together in this argument. For more 
responsible (virtue) agents, some ‘restrictions’ merge into 
the background and their enabling character comes to the 
fore. They facilitate cooperation and trust; in corporate 
terms, they provide or strengthen ‘social licenses to operate’ 
(Demuijnck and Fasterling 2016). As part of the responsi-
bilities (prospective) that an agent endorses, they become 
second nature. Since the agent takes responsibility (prospec-
tive) for them, there is less need to hold the agent responsible 
(retrospective). If the agent does go wrong, we may register 
greater disappointment. At the same time, holding responsi-
ble will involve less effort and costs, since the agent is better 
able to take responsibility (retrospective). By contrast, less 
responsible (vice!) agents are less able or willing to live up 
to their responsibilities; they will be more likely to take a 
partial or unreasonable view of their duties; they will chafe 
under reasonable regulations and other norms; they will try 
to deny legitimate criticism and evade adverse responses. 
Other agents must bear the ongoing responsibility (prospec-
tive) of reminding them of their responsibilities and holding 
them responsible. Although these attempts are bound to feel 
restrictive and hard-going for all concerned, the price of not 
holding these agents responsible is to give up on the relevant 
standards and to sacrifice the trust and cooperation that they 
might have fostered. Practices of responsibility thus play a 
vital enabling role. They may foster abilities to take respon-
sibility, that is, to acknowledge past wrongs and do better in 
future—for example, as a company learns from reputational 
damage and makes the organisational changes needed to pre-
vent future infractions. They alter the structure of incentives, 
discouraging further misconduct and reassuring other actors 
who might otherwise have been tempted to go wrong. At the 
very least, they help to keep responsibilities and norms from 
being lost to view.
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